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Between the Hockey Rink and the
Voting Booth
THE ADA AND ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Tennessee v. Lane1 on May 17, 2004, there has been a flurry of
cases questioning the validity of abrogation of sovereign
immunity by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA Title II”)2 in various public service contexts.3 Two cases,
McNulty v. Board of Education of Calvert County4 and
Association for Disabled Americans v. Florida International
University,5 have considered whether the ADA validly
abrogates Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for
private suits alleging violations of Title II in the educational
context. These two cases yielded conflicting results. This Note
argues that only the latter, in its finding that private
individuals may sue the state for violations of Title II in the
1

541 U.S. 509 (2004).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150 (2000).
3
See, e.g., Bill M. ex rel. William M. v. Neb. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs. Fin. and Support, 408 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that Lane only
applies to the specific right of access to courts and related claims and rejecting suit
under Title II for denial of certain Medicaid-funded services); Miller v. King, 384 F.3d
1248, 1272-74 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that the “negative obligation” of the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, as opposed to the
positive due process guarantee of accessible courts, makes abrogation a
disproportionate remedy in the prison context when the Eighth Amendment right is
“the only right at issue”); Simmang v. Texas Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 346 F .Supp. 2d 874,
882 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not validly
abrogated by the ADA Title II for allegations against the state board of law examiners
because “the right to practice law is not a fundamental right for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment” (quoting Tolchin v. Supreme Court of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099,
1114 (3d Cir. 1997))); Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., 338 F. Supp. 2d 797, 803 (N.D.
Ohio 2004) (finding that sovereign immunity is not abrogated in a suit against the
state for inaccessibility of drug rehabilitation treatment facilities, relying heavily on
divide between legislation protecting due process rights and equal protection
guarantees).
4
No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2520, 2004 WL 1554401 (D. Md. July 8, 2004).
5
405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005).
2
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educational context, correctly applied Lane and, further, that
this decision should have extended to acknowledge the
possibility of valid abrogation authorizing the imposition
of liability for violations of both due process and equal
protection guarantees.
In Lane, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth
Circuit’s remand of the ADA Title II claim of George Lane, a
paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, against the state of
Tennessee for the denial of “access to, and the services of, the
state court system.”6 The Court found that Mr. Lane asserted a
valid claim for equitable relief and damages against the state
under the ADA Title II.7 The finding that Title II validly
abrogated state sovereign immunity in the context of access to
courts was a central focus of the Court’s holding. McNulty was
decided on July 8, 2004 in the District Court of Maryland and
purports to follow Lane. In McNulty, a high school student
brought a claim under the ADA Title II against the Calvert
County Board of Education.8 The district court dismissed the
claim, finding that state immunity was not validly abrogated
by the ADA in the context of public education because
disability is not a suspect class and education is not a
fundamental right.9 In Association for Disabled Americans,
plaintiffs with hearing impairments brought suit for equitable
relief against Florida International University (“FIU”) alleging
that the University’s failure to provide appropriate interpreters
and other assistance violated the ADA Title II.10 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed the Southern District of Florida’s decision
granting FIU’s motion to dismiss based on Eleventh
Amendment immunity.11

6

Lane, 541 U.S. at 513-15.
Id. at 515.
8
McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *2. The defendants included the “Board of
Education of Calvert County; J. Kenneth Horsmon, superintendent of Calvert County
Public Schools; Kathryn Coleman, director of student services; Raymond D’Arienzo,
supervisor of student services; George Miller, principal of Northern High School; Craig
Hunter, vice principal of Northern High School; Karen Neal, former vice principal of
Northern High School; and James Parent, principal of the Calvert Career Center.” Id.
9
The McNulty court dismissed a Title II claim for money damages for failure
to state a claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at *2,
8.
10
Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1292 (S.D.
Fla. 2001), rev’d by 405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005).
11
Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 959 (11th Cir.
2005).
7
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This Note will argue that Lane prescribed the result in
Association for Disabled Americans and that McNulty, in
contrast, took an inappropriately narrow view of Lane by
summarily foreclosing the possibility of maintaining private
actions for education claims under the ADA Title II solely
because education is not considered a fundamental right under
the Federal Constitution. Although the Lane Court gave
substantial weight to the fact that the right at issue was access
to courts, the fundamental nature of the right is not entirely
controlling in the determination of whether federal legislation,
and specifically the ADA Title II, may properly abrogate states’
immunity to private suits pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s section 5 power.
Association for Disabled
Americans acknowledged this but did not engage in a
comprehensive analysis of the claim in the educational context
sufficient to support future differentiation from claimed
violations in other public service contexts. In arguing that the
Eleventh Circuit reached the proper result, this Note also seeks
to supplement the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in two ways:
First, this discussion more thoroughly demonstrates why the
educational context presents a special case for valid abrogation.
Second, it argues that abrogation is valid with regard to claims
that implicate either the due process or equal protection
guarantee.
Part II will briefly discuss the scope, purpose, and
requirements of the ADA generally and Title II specifically.
Next, Part III will discuss the evolution of the abrogation
analysis and what the Lane decision added to the established
standard, specifically addressing the question of whether Title
II validly abrogates sovereign immunity.
Part IV will
illustrate, using the case examples of McNulty and Association
for Disabled Americans, how courts should apply this standard
acknowledging that the fundamental right consideration was
not dispositive in Lane. The McNulty court should not have
dismissed the claim under Title II relying solely on the premise
that when a nonfundamental right is at issue, the ADA’s
abrogation of sovereign immunity under Title II cannot under
any circumstances be valid.
Association for Disabled
Americans reached the proper result but should have also
engaged in a thorough abrogation analysis sufficient to support
future similar decisions in the context of public education. This
last part of the Note will suggest a comprehensive alternative
analysis that district courts, like the McNulty court, should use
to maintain consistency with precedent, including Lane.
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Unlike the McNulty court’s method, this analysis considers the
impact of the educational context on the abrogation question.
II.

THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, TITLE II

Based on extensive legislative findings that contributed
to a lengthy and influential legislative history, Congress passed
the Americans with Disabilities Act12 in 1990. The final version
included summaries of the findings and purposes of the law.13
Two important summary findings relate that
some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities, and [that] this number is increasing as the population as
a whole is growing older [and] discrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment,
housing, public accommodations, education, transportation,
communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services,
voting, and access to public services . . . .14

To remedy growing and pervasive discrimination in
these “critical” areas, Congress purported to invoke both the
Article I commerce power and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
“sweep of Congressional authority.”15 The latter authority,
section 5 enforcement power, may be invoked to implement the
equal protection or due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under this authority, the ADA Title II asserts
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”16

12

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 12101 outlines the findings and purposes behind the drafting
and passing of the ADA as a whole. Titles I, II, and III address discrimination against
people with disabilities in different contexts. Title I addresses employment, Title II
addresses public services, programs, and activities, and Title III addresses public
accommodations. See id. §§ 12101. This section briefly summarizes the lengthy
legislative history behind the Act and then focuses on the specifics of Title II.
14
Id. § 12101(a)(1), (a)(3).
15
Id. § 12101(b)(4). Abrogation of sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Commerce Clause has long been considered an invalid use of Congressional power.
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 79 (2000).
16
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). See 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (2000) (implementing
regulations of the ADA Title II nondiscrimination requirement); see also 42 U.S.C. §
12131(1) (2000) (“The term ‘public entity’ means any State or local government . . . .”);
[T]he term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential
13
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To guard against disability discrimination, Title II’s
requirement of “reasonable modifications”17 and corresponding
regulations outline how public entities are required to modify
existing services and facilities18 and construct new facilities.19
Importantly, the regulations include the significant
qualification that they do not “[r]equire a public entity to take
any action that it can demonstrate would result in a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or
activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.”20
The enforcement provision of Title II routes through
other legislative acts, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 196421 via the Rehabilitation Act,22 providing that an
aggrieved individual may bring a civil action for injunctive
It is this
relief, and possibly compensatory damages.23
enforcement provision, combined with the ADA’s express
abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity,24 that is the focus of
the controversy over whether the ADA as a whole, or the Titles
individually, validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. Congress included the abrogation of sovereign
immunity to serve as a powerful tool to protect “individuals
with disabilities [because they] are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations,
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society . . . .”25 This abrogation provision is a major component
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity.
Id. § 12131(2). See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000) for definitions generally.
17
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000).
18
28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2000).
19
Id. § 35.151 (2000).
20
Id. § 35.150(a)(3). See also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004)
(discussing the “reasonable measures” the legislation requires in the proportionality
assessment); infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing how these internal limitations rebut the
argument that the legislation is overbroad and seeks to enforce more than irrational
disability discrimination).
21
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d7 (2000).
22
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
23
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) has been interpreted to provide for damages
relief. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-601 (1983) (explaining
that the drafters of Title VI aimed primarily at the provision of “preventive relief,” but
that victims of intentional discrimination may also be entitled to compensatory
damages); see also Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 655
n.11 (discussing the use of Title VI remedies for application of the ADA Title II and
possible interpretive problems arising from incorporation of those remedies).
24
42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000).
25
Id. § 12101(a)(7).
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of the ADA’s goal of providing “a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”26
III.

THE STANDARD FOR ABROGATION

The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Eleventh Amendment27 to hold nonconsenting states immune
from suits by citizens of other states and citizens of their own
The ADA expressly abrogates states’ Eleventh
states.28
Amendment immunity to private suits when a claim is brought
due to a violation of the Act:
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any
action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this
chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are
available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies
are available for such a violation in an action against any public or
private entity other than a State.29

Generally, the Court has deemed abrogation of this
immunity valid in some instances when Congress acts
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment section 5 power, but
never when Congress acts pursuant to Article I.30 In order for
26

Id. § 12101(b)(1).
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XI. There are, however, four prominent instances in which suits
against a state are permitted. The United States may sue a state. See, e.g., United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 141 (1965). States may sue each other under
certain circumstances. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982).
A private individual may sue a state officer for prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 165-67 (1908). Finally, an individual may sue the state
or a state agency when the Eleventh Amendment immunity is validly abrogated by
section 5. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). The fourth instance
is at issue here.
28
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
(reiterating this interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment immunity, citing the line of
cases extending the immunity). See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN,
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.35 (2d ed. 2004) (addressing progression of
interpretations of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
29
42 U.S.C. § 12202.
30
See supra note 15. There are some instances in which the Fourteenth
Amendment’s section 5 power may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity because
the Fourteenth Amendment is directed specifically at imposing some limitations on the
state and such limitations may sometimes be “appropriate legislation” to enforce
provisions of section 1. This valid abrogation pursuant to section 5 relies heavily on
the chronology and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was adopted after the
27
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Congress to validly abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to
section 5, Congress must (1) explicitly intend to abrogate
sovereign immunity, and (2) be legislating within the bounds of
the power granted to Congress by section 5.31
A.

Express Intent to Abrogate

The first part of the analysis, express statutory intent to
abrogate, generally presents a low bar and is answered
affirmatively in most instances.32 In Lane, for example, the
Court found that section 12202 of the ADA unequivocally
expressed Congress’s intent to abrogate sovereign immunity to
private suits by simply looking at the statutory language.33 The
second “predicate question,”34 whether abrogation was within
Congress’s grant of power, is more complicated.
B.

Section Five Enforcement Power and the Boerne
Proportionality Test

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress
the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment through “appropriate legislation.”35 Congress may
invoke this power to enforce the due process and equal
protection guarantees of section 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

Eleventh and for the purpose of limiting state power to protect national citizens.
Article I legislation, for similar reasons, cannot validly abrogate immunity. Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-54. (1976); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
72-73 (1996); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003). See also
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Colker, supra note 23, at 701 (2000)
(emphasizing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act unquestionably abrogates sovereign
immunity and it is only a question of when, not if, Congress may so abrogate).
31
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72 (2000) (citing these
instances).
32
See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726 (citing the “clarity” of Congress’ intent to
abrogate immunity in the Family Medical Leave Act); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202 as an unequivocal expression of abrogating sovereign
immunity in beginning examination of Title I); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78 (finding that suits
against the states are authorized by the ADEA).
33
Lane, 541 U.S. at 517-18.
34
Id. at 517.
35
“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.36

In City of Boerne v. Flores,37 the Court developed a test
to determine the validity of legislation enacted pursuant to the
section 5 enforcement power. Boerne was concerned with the
ability of Congress to pass legislation pursuant to section 5, not
with abrogation of sovereign immunity. Boerne’s test, however,
is important here because it demonstrates when Congress may
act pursuant to its section 5 power, the second component of
the abrogation analysis.38 Such legislation must be remedial
and not substantive,39 and it must be congruent and
proportional to identified violations.40
The Boerne court found that the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) was not remedial because the
legislative record lacked evidence of violations during the forty
years preceding the Act’s passage.41 The Court agreed that the
scope of the right at issue was the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion,42 but asserted, in essence, that there were
not recent and significant violations to remedy.43 Second, the
Court found that the legislation attempted to change the way
courts reviewed claims brought under the Due Process Clause

36

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Boerne, the Court invalidated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 determining that its proposed remedy was
disproportionate to the enforcement of constitutional guarantees and instead was
aimed at changing the content of those guarantees. Id. at 532.
38
The first component is that the legislation explicitly outline its intention to
abrogate sovereign immunity, as discussed supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
39
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 521.
40
Id. at 520.
41
Id. at 530.
42
Id. at 519. This is the determination of the “scope” of the constitutional
right at stake. In other cases, the scope of the right is less clear and depends on the
questions of whether the alleged violation of the right involves a suspect classification
or implicates a fundamental right. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004)
(disability is not a suspect classification and access to courts is a fundamental right);
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (gender classification
warrants heightened scrutiny); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
366 (2001) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and
reiterating that disability classifications are not suspect and warrant only rational
basis review); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (age is not a suspect
classification and warrants only rational basis review).
43
The Boerne court engages in a lengthy examination of section 5, including
history of the Framers’ intent and use of the enforcement power, to support the
proposition that it is a remedial and not substantive power. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 52029.
37
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of the Fourteenth Amendment,44 risking substantively
changing the amendment’s guarantees.
The Court
implemented a test of congruence and proportionality to
determine where this line exists between permissible remedial
and impermissible substantive use of the enforcement clause.45
In making the congruence and proportionality
determination, the Boerne Court examined the Congressional
record to determine whether Congress enacted the legislation
due to historical and continuing constitutional violations. The
Court relied on the dearth of current and pervasive instances of
violations to identify the Act’s most serious shortcoming:46 the
legislation’s failure to be proportional to any constitutional
This
violation described in the legislative history.47
determination was based on the Court’s perception of the
expansive and interminable sweep of the legislation that
reached many laws unlikely to violate any constitutional
RFRA explicitly required the state to show a
rights.48
compelling interest for certain legislation where the Court had
previously determined that due process required less stringent
review of similar state legislation. RFRA’s fatal breadth was
evident because of the lack of relevant legislative history
The permissible
documenting constitutional violations.49
44

Id. at 535. Congress was trying to reestablish a standard of review the
Court had rejected in Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
45
The Court emphasized that
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right
is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what
constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be
enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the
Fourteenth Amendment].” . . . While the line between measures that remedy
or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive
change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have
wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be
observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.
Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation
and effect. History and our case law support drawing the distinction, one
apparent from the text of the Amendment.
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, brackets in
original).
46
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. The Court found the disproportionality more fatal
than the lack of legislative evidence: “[L]ack of support in the legislative record . . . is
not [the legislation’s] most serious shortcoming.” Id. at 531.
47
The Court concluded that the legislation “is so out of proportion to a
supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to,
or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” Id. at 532.
48
Id.
49
The recent cases dealing with sovereign immunity have similarly looked to
the Congressional findings before making a determination as to whether legislation is
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breadth of a remedial statute narrows as the constitutional
violations contemplated by Congress and demonstrated in the
legislative history, the foundational concerns of the statute,
diminish.50
Boerne is important because it lays out the congruence
and proportionality test, the second piece of the abrogation
analysis. Because in most cases the question as to whether a
statute intends to abrogate is easily answered, congruence and
proportionality becomes decisive in the abrogation inquiry.
C.

Setting the Stage for Lane: Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett51

Garrett is the most relevant precedent to Lane for the
purposes of this discussion, having applied the test for
abrogation in its entirety to ADA claims. The Garrett Court
cited express intent to abrogate in the ADA, identified the
scope of the right at stake, and assessed the congruence and
proportionality of Title I.52 Garrett involved the cases of two53
congruent and proportional to Congress’ objectives that are supposed to be based on
those findings. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003)
(“[T]he States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, genderbased discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to
justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.”); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001) (citing the great amount of discrimination outlined in
legislative findings and pointedly relying on the dearth of evidence of violations specific
to the right at issue: “Congress assembled . . . minimal evidence of unconstitutional
state discrimination in employment against the disabled.”) (emphasis added); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (emphasizing that Congress lacked findings
of age discrimination by the states when passing the legislation in question: “Congress
had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age.”).
50
While striking down the legislation in question, the Boerne court did
preserve Congress’ power to enforce broad legislation that “prohibits conduct which is
not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States.’” 521 U.S. at 530 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
455 (1976)). Congress is permitted to enforce “broadly sweeping” legislation under
certain circumstances, even when it might interfere with traditionally exclusive
territory of the state. Id. at 517-18. Proportionality is the key.
51
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
52
Id. at 365.
53
Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham, 989 F. Supp.
1409, 1410-12 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (consolidating and granting the state’s motion for
summary judgment in both cases for claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,
and the FMLA). The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment as to the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act, but affirmed immunity as to the claim brought pursuant to the
FMLA. Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th
Cir. 1999). The ADA claims seeking money damages in suit against the state were the
only claims in front of the United States Supreme Court. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360
(2001).
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employees of state agencies who claimed protection under Title
I of the ADA and brought suit against the state of Alabama for
discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.54
The Garrett Court briefly acknowledged the ADA’s
express intent to abrogate55 and then moved to “identify with
some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.”56
Because the Garrett Court was dealing with claims of
employment discrimination, the Court determined the scope of
the constitutional right at issue by discussing whether
disability is a suspect classification for equal protection
purposes.57 Citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center58
with approval, the Court repeated that disability is not a
suspect classification and that such classification by the state
warrants only rational basis review.59 Emphasizing that the
House and Committee Reports repeatedly mention
“employment in the private sector”60 and that state
discrimination in employment is not mentioned in the Act’s
54

Patricia Garrett took leave from her work as a Director of Nursing for the
University of Alabama hospital to undergo treatment for breast cancer and was denied
her director position upon return. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362. Milton Ash requested
modification of his employment environment and hours due to asthma and sleep apnea
upon a doctor’s recommendation, was denied those requests, and reported low work
evaluations he attributed to the requests. Id.
55
Id. at 364.
56
Id. at 365.
57
Id.
58
473 U.S. 432 (1985) (striking down the application of a city ordinance using
only rational basis review because state action classifying people with disabilities is not
considered suspect). Ruth Colker argues that Cleburne was decided on the premise
that Congress was actively seeking to redress disability discrimination and applying
heightened scrutiny would inhibit Congressional affirmative action to remedy
unconstitutional behavior:
It turns City of Cleburne on its head to say that the majority chose rational
basis scrutiny because it wanted to restrict the power of Congress to impose
affirmative obligations on the states to benefit individuals with
disabilities . . . . The majority . . . chose rational basis scrutiny because it had
confidence that federal and state governments were seeking to create
affirmative rights for individuals with disabilities.
Colker, supra note 23, at 692.
59
The Court said that “States are not required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled [and that if] special
accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive
law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.” Garrett, 531 U.S. 367-68. For an
argument that this language is misleading, especially in light of Garrett’s disparate
treatment grievance that lacked any request for “special” (the Court’s language) or
even “reasonable” (the ADA’s language) accommodations, see Anita Silvers & Michael
Ashley Stein, From Plessy (1896) and Goesart (1948) to Cleburne (1985) and Garrett
(2001): A Chill Wind from the Past Blows Equal Protection Away, in BACKLASH
AGAINST THE ADA 221, 240-4 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003).
60
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989)).
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legislative findings, the Court dismissed the argument that
there was evidence in the legislative record to support findings
of unconstitutional employment discrimination in public
Evidence of discrimination in private
employment.61
employment did not support Title I’s purported enforcement of
constitutional guarantees in public employment. Unconvinced
by more general evidence of state discrimination against people
with disabilities in other areas covered by the ADA, the Court
concluded that Title I does not validly abrogate sovereign
immunity to allow private suits against state employers.62
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that without evidence of a
pattern of discrimination and targeted congruent and
proportional legislation, “the Act’s application to the States
would allow Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment
law laid down by this Court in Cleburne”63 amounting to a
substantive rather than remedial use of section 5 power.
Although this holding only explicitly prohibited the
application of Title I to states, it supported the high bar that
the Court would apply to future claims of abrogation of state
sovereign immunity under other Titles of the ADA.64 The
question became whether a private suit against the state under
any Title of the ADA could be separated from the holding on
Title I in Garrett and deemed consistent with, and not
impermissibly expansive of, extant substantive guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
D.

Interpreting Garrett: Popovich v. Cuyahoga County65

The Lane Court was not the first to attempt to apply
Garrett’s analysis to Title II of the ADA. Garrett is vulnerable
to at least two distinct interpretations that the Lane Court
recognized even though it declined to definitively adopt one to
the exclusion of the other.66 Popovich v. Cuyahoga County,67
61

Id. at 372.
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, however, that recourse under Title I still
applies to private employers, that the federal government may sue states for money
damages, and that individuals may still seek injunctive relief against the state under
Title I. Id. at 374 n.9.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th
Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, Popovich v. Cuyahoga County, 537 U.S. 812 (2002).
66
This Note argues that in using the fundamental rights tack, the Lane
Court does not deem the equal protection route invalid. See infra Part IV.
67
Popovich, 276 F.3d 808.
62
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more specifically the majority and concurrence therein, outline
the tension that exists between these possible interpretations
of Garrett. The Popovich opinions discussed whether Title II
may validly abrogate sovereign immunity, pursuant to the
section 5 power, to enforce both the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 This
case is important for the purposes of this Note for three
reasons: the Lane Court discussed the Popovich decision and
the concurrence without approving either strict approach,69 the
Court denied certiorari on Popovich upon the state’s appeal,
and the case also dealt with Title II and disability
discrimination related to access to courts. Additionally, the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Popovich influenced the remand by
the Sixth Circuit in Lane,70 which the Supreme Court affirmed.
This discussion is essential here because disability
discrimination in education, the specific issue in McNulty and
Association for Disabled Americans, deals with a challenge to
irrational disability discrimination, implicating Title II’s
enforcement of the equal protection rather than due process
guarantee. The concurrence in Popovich is an especially useful
guide for determining how a court should deal with examining
whether Title II is an appropriate enforcement of the equal
protection guarantee.
In Popovich an individual with a hearing impairment
brought suit under Title II of the ADA due to the State’s failure
to provide adequate hearing assistance in his child custody
case that would have afforded him meaningful access to court.71
The majority opinion read Garrett as excluding the possibility
that Title I validly abrogates sovereign immunity when
Popovich stated
addressing equal protection violations.72

68

Id. at 810-11.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 514-15 (2004).
70
Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 2003).
71
Popovich, 276 F.3d at 811. Indeed, the facts of Popovich implicate not only
the fundamental right of access to courts, but also the “special nature of parental
rights” that is “sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 813-14 (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
72
Id. at 812. The court noted this exclusion’s basis in Garrett:
The [Garrett] Court, noting that the Title I legislation is limited to
employment discrimination against the disabled, said that “the scope of the
constitutional right at issue” is simply “equal protection” . . . . The Court then
held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress the
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause by authorizing federal
employment discrimination suits against states based purely on disability.
69

602

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

conclusively that “congressional authority under section 5 to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause is limited and will not
sustain the Disabilities Act as an exception to Eleventh
Amendment state immunity.”73 Popovich also expressed a
willingness to extend Garrett’s reasoning to all Titles of the
ADA, acknowledging that there is only a small possibility that
the Supreme Court may distinguish Garrett in future cases
involving the other Titles.74
The Popovich court did, however, remand because it
deemed
Title II’s abrogation of sovereign immunity an
appropriate section 5 enforcement of the Due Process Clause.75
The Popovich court emphasized that a major distinction
between Titles I and II is the type of claims the Titles cover,
with the latter “encompass[ing] various due process-type
claims with varying standards of liability . . . not limited to
equal protection claims.”76 Considering the nature of the
fundamental rights involved in meaningful access to child
custody hearings, Popovich held that Congress was within its
power to legislate immunity abrogation and by doing so was
“enforcing” rather than “expanding” the due process
guarantee.77 The majority failed to explain, however, why
Congress cannot “enforce” rather than “expand” the Equal
Protection Clause’s guarantee against irrational disability
discrimination.
Whether Congress sought to enforce the
prohibition on irrational disability discrimination or sought to
Id. The court specified that abrogation is invalid as an enforcement of the Equal
Protection Clause in other contexts, clearly stemming from this interpretation of
Garrett:
We reverse and remand the case for a new trial because the charge to the
jury appears to permit the jury to find in favor of the plaintiff if it finds
discrimination against him or exclusion from public proceedings based on
equal protection principles. After Garrett, this is an impermissible basis on
which to base federal jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment or a
verdict and damages against a state court under the Disabilities Act.
Id. at 816.
73
Id. at 812.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 813.
76
Popovich, 276 F.3d at 813. Lane uses very similar language to describe the
coverage of Title II, noting that
Title II, like Title I, seeks to enforce this prohibition on irrational disability
discrimination. But it also seeks to enforce a variety of other basic
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more
searching judicial review. These rights include some, like the right of access
to the courts at issue in this case, that are protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-23 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
77
Popovich, 276 F.3d at 815.
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enforce the due process guarantee served as the Popovich
court’s key to assessing the validity of the ADA’s abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity.78 Popovich does not even
address Garrett’s lengthy discussion of the legislative history of
Title I and the distinction Garrett makes between evidence of
violations supporting Title I and evidence of violations
supporting Titles II or III.
Judge Moore’s concurring opinion in Popovich specified
this shortcoming in the court’s opinion.
The Popovich
concurrence refused to foreclose the possibility that Title II’s
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity could be a valid
enforcement of the equal protection guarantee particularly
because that question was not even before the court.79 While
the majority seemed to forego the application of any type of
standard to state action under the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection, highlighting that “the scope of the
constitutional right at issue [was] simply equal protection,”80
the concurrence reminded the court that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits “arbitrary and invidious discrimination
against individuals with disabilities [and that] ‘the [disabled],
like others, have and retain their substantive constitutional
rights in addition to the right to be treated equally by the
law.’”81 Agreeing that when the scope of the right does not
extend further than that afforded by the guarantee to be
treated equally by the law (when there is a nonfundamental
right involved) Congress cannot impose more than equal
protection liability,82 the concurrence asserted that this liability
nonetheless mandates that states act rationally.83 This was not
an issue in Garrett because no history of irrational disability
discrimination in public employment had been identified, not

78
Popovich also discussed the separation of powers problem at length, citing
the boundaries of Congress’ section 5 enforcement power to prohibit a “‘broader swath
of conduct’ than the courts have themselves identified as unconstitutional.” Id. at 813
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001)).
79
Id. at 818 (Moore, J., concurring).
80
Id. at 812 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 963) (emphasis added, internal
quotation marks omitted). The court continues, “Title I does not encompass claims
based on substantive rights under the Due Process Clause, and therefore the scope of
the constitutional right Congress is enforcing does not go beyond equal protection
liability.” Id.
81
Id. at 818 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985)) (emphasis added).
82
Popovich, 276 F.3d at 812.
83
Id. at 818 (Moore, J., concurring).
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because Congress was powerless to remedy equal protection
violations had they occurred therein.
Judge Moore specifically referenced Garrett’s focus on
Congress’ failure to identify a history and pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination in public employment and the
resulting reluctance to accept enforcement of Title I against the
states.84 In doing so, Judge Moore underscored that Garrett’s
review of the legislative history of Title I cannot also be
considered a review of the legislative history of Title II. Judge
Moore felt that a Title II claim requires review of documented
constitutional violations in relation to the specific claim being
brought in order to determine the validity of section 5
enforcement power regarding immunity abrogation. Judge
Moore asserted that the enforcement clause can validly remedy
either due process or equal protection violations.85 Moreover,
the concurrence cited the legislative history and evidence
before Congress that supported Title II, noting the distinction
from the lack of history in Garrett. Quoting the majority’s
declaration that the right involved here “sounds more clearly
not in equal protection but in due process,”86 the concurrence
pointed out that the evidence of “states’ discrimination against
the disabled in areas such as voting and education[] clearly
implicates the Equal Protection Clause.”87 Judge Moore did not
see reason to foreclose the application of Title II against the
states for the violation of the Constitution’s equal protection
guarantee, especially when the question of a nonfundamental
right was not before the court.

84

Id. Judge Moore was unequivocal in her assertion that Garrett’s finding on
Title I does not control abrogation findings under the other Titles of the Act. Id.
85
Id. Consider also that Lane’s as applied approach more closely resembled
Judge Moore’s inclination to assess Title II on its own merits, in review of its own
legislative history. This supports the argument that Lane does not adopt the Popovich
majority’s approach that propounds validity of abrogation only in protection of
substantive due process rights.
86
Id. at 820 (Moore, J., concurring).
87
Popovich, 276 F.3d at 820. Judge Moore’s language here presents an
interesting comparison to the Justice Stevens authored majority opinion in Lane:
Whatever might be said about Title II’s other applications, the question
presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly subject the States
to private suits for money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to
hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether Congress had the power
under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the courts.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-31 (2004). Justice Stevens framed this to
compare access to courts to other rights one may claim along Title II’s spectrum of
protection; Moore uses similar language to discuss when Title II may validly be used to
enforce equal protection by mentioning voting and education.
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Finally, in demonstrating the congruence and
proportionality of the section 5 power used in Title II to enforce
equal protection rather than due process, Judge Moore pointed
out that in order to take
some affirmative steps to ensure that the disabled have access to
governmental programs, [Title II] targets discrimination that is
unreasonable. Title II requires reasonable modifications only when
a disabled individual is otherwise eligible for a public service and the
modifications would not fundamentally alter the nature of the
service. The states therefore maintain their discretion over the
provision of public services so long as they do not arbitrarily
discriminate against the disabled.88

These named internal limitations, in combination with
the record behind Title II, convinced Judge Moore that “Title II
is a more congruent and proportional remedy than Title I.”89
The Lane Court’s refusal to definitively resolve the
Popovich tension, even after the Sixth Circuit applied Popovich
to Lane, strongly implies that the Court intended to hold the
door open to nonfundamental rights claims under Title II.
Much of Judge Moore’s reasoning is echoed in Lane – from the
parsing of the ADA into an “as applied”90 approach to the
thorough review of the legislative history behind each
purported protection. Additionally, Judge Moore’s mentioning
of voting and education may be said to have influenced Stevens’
idea of the spectrum of possible claims ranging from hockey
rinks to voting booths. In naming these extremes, Justice
Stevens likely countenanced claims that would implicate
fundamental rights and nonfundamental rights associated with
equal protection, ranging in importance from education to
access to hockey rinks. Lane mentioned this Popovich tension
but did not resolve it because only the due process guarantee
was at issue on the facts of the case. However, cases that deal
exclusively with the equal protection guarantee, like McNulty
88
Popovich, 276 F.3d at 820 (Moore, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See
also Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 959 (11th Cir. 2005)
(emphasizing similarly that states maintain discretion over the provision of public
services and that the ADA only calls for reasonable accommodations, barring only
irrational discrimination).
89
Popovich, 276 F.3d at 820 (Moore, J., concurring); cf. Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370-73 (2001) (rejecting the congruence and
proportionality of Title I, even assuming “it [were] possible to squeeze out of these
examples a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination”).
90
Lane, 541 U.S. at 551 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For ease of
discussion, this Note accepts Chief Justice Rehnquist’s labeling of the Court’s analysis
as the “as applied” approach and will refer to it as such throughout the discussion.
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and Association for Disabled Americans, should engage in this
prescribed inquiry.
E.

The Post-Lane Standard
1. The Facts of Lane

George Lane and Beverly Jones brought a private suit
against the state of Tennessee seeking damages and equitable
relief.91 Due to paraplegia, both Lane and Jones were unable to
access certain court facilities and services in county
courthouses.92 Lane was required to attend court for criminal
proceedings93 and Jones needed to access court for her work as
a certified court reporter.94 Neither plaintiff found the county
courthouses to be wheelchair accessible.95 The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Title II validly
abrogates Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for the
due process claim involving access to courts.96
The U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgment of the
fundamental nature of the right at stake was important in this
holding, but the Court did not foreclose the possibility of valid
abrogation when a fundamental right is not at stake and when
only equal protection violations are identified. Additionally,
the position of certain rights on the spectrum between a hockey
rink and a voting booth97 may also impact the abrogation
analysis.

91

Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 513.
93
Id. In the Lane analysis, the nature of Lane’s compulsion to appear in
court is significant to the identification of a fundamental right, as the court cites the
“variety” of constitutional guarantees Title II seeks to enforce including the Due
Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 522-23.
94
Id. at 514.
95
Lane, 541 U.S. at 514. Lane, in fact, had crawled up the stairs to attend
his first appearance and at the second hearing he refused to crawl or be carried up the
stairs. Id.
96
In fact, the Sixth Circuit remanded, Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 682
(6th Cir. 2003), and the Supreme Court affirmed remand for further proceedings on the
factual record after finding abrogation valid in the context of this due process claim.
Tennessee argued that due process rights were not at stake and the claimants
disagreed. Lane, 541 U.S. at 515.
97
See infra Part IV (arguing that equal protection violations warrant
exercise of section 5 power abrogating sovereign immunity and that education holds a
special place on the Court’s conceptualized spectrum).
92
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2. Scope of the Right/Identification of a Fundamental
Right
The Lane Court cited precedent, including Garrett, at
length but also discussed the prior Sixth Circuit case, Popovich,
involving Title II and access to courts. The Popovich98 majority
drew a clear distinction between due process and equal
protection violations and the justifiable exercise of the section 5
power for abrogation in enforcement of the ADA’s Title II.99
The Lane Court cited this distinction made by Popovich, but
did not explicitly adopt it. Instead, the Court left open the
question as to Title II’s remedies dealing with equal protection
violations not necessarily implicating fundamental rights.
Importantly, the Lane Court also did not adopt the same
distinction the Sixth Circuit made in Lane to accord with the
Circuit’s holding in Popovich – that Title II may validly
abrogate sovereign immunity to remedy due process violations
but not equal protection violations. The Lane Court continued
with the standard abrogation analysis rather than base its
decision on the due process-equal protection divide.100

98

See supra Part III.D.
276 F.3d 808, 811 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
100
See Lane, 541 U.S. at 515-17. Interestingly, much of the Sixth Circuit’s
language in Lane lauded the remedy of Title II to constitutional violations identified in
the legislative history as congruent and proportional. Indeed, much of this praise can
support an argument for finding Title II abrogation valid in a wider range of
constitutional violations than for infringement of the fundamental right of access to
courts. The Sixth Circuit discussed this at length:
Title II ensures that the refusal to accommodate an individual with a
disability is genuinely based on unreasonable cost or actual inability to
accommodate, not on inconvenience or unfounded concerns about costs. This
statutory protection is a preventive measure commensurate to the gravity of
precluding access to the courts by those with disabilities. In addition, these
requirements are carefully tailored to the unique features of disability
discrimination that persists in public services.
A simple ban on
discrimination against those with disabilities lacks teeth. The continuing
legacy of discrimination is too powerful. Title II affirmatively promotes
integration of those with disabilities.
Lane, 315 F.3d at 683. One may argue that the acknowledgment of this recognized
history of disability discrimination in public services, and the recognition that section 5
enforcement needs “teeth” in light of this history, militates against denying equal
protection guarantees the same force of protection. If there were not any affirmative
enforcement mechanisms for remedying equal protection violations, irrational
disability discrimination would also persist. See also David R. Fine, Court Left Issues
Open, NAT’L L.J. 23, June 7, 2004, at 23, as cited in McNulty, for a brief discussion of
the Court’s possible motivation for alluding to this divide but not ascribing to it. Fine
feels that the Court may have rejected it if not for the need to bring in Justice
O’Connor. Id.
99
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Lane discussed both the nature of the right at issue and
the historical discrimination outlined in the legislative record,
thus adhering to the well-established standard of determining
whether sovereign immunity has been validly abrogated. The
Lane Court applied the standard Boerne proportionality test;
Lane’s further identification of a fundamental right necessarily
weighed into this proportionality test, perhaps mostly because
the specific right at stake based upon those facts “sound[ed]
most clearly not in equal protection but in due process.”101
However, Lane’s holding did not deem the identification of a
fundamental right essential to finding the ADA’s abrogation
provision valid in all circumstances.
After confirming that the ADA expressly intends to
abrogate sovereign immunity,102 the Lane Court began the
Boerne analysis by identifying the scope of the right at issue.103
In Lane,
the task of identifying the scope of the relevant constitutional
protection [was] more difficult [than in Garrett] because Title II
purports to enforce a panoply of constitutional rights of disabled
persons: not only the equal protection right against irrational
discrimination, but also certain rights protected by the Due Process
Clause.104

This broad coverage, however, does not mandate the
finding that Title II is overbroad, does not require that each
Title II protection be scrutinized at once, and does not declare
that Title II protections must rest entirely on the identification
of a fundamental right under the due process clause.105
Instead, this coverage demonstrates Congress’ identification of
constitutional violations that impact both fundamental and
nonfundamental rights, including the right to be treated
equally under the law.

101

Popovich, 276 F.3d at 820. See supra note 86.
Lane, 541 U.S. at 518.
103
Id. at 522. First, the Court reiterated Garrett’s articulation of “the
Fourteenth Amendment’s command that ‘all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike’” and emphasized that Title II “also seeks to enforce a variety of other
basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching
judicial review.” Id. at 522-23 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
104
Id. at 540 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
105
Id. at 522-23. The Court lists all of the constitutional rights involving
some kind of access to courts protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, including rights guaranteed by the First and Sixth Amendments. Id. at
523.
102
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The prohibition on unconstitutional irrational disability
discrimination remains intact as a crucial determinant for the
validity of prophylactic legislation where there is no
fundamental right implicated. The Court’s identification of the
importance of access to courts motivated it to find in favor of
abrogation by citing history of discrimination in public services
and accommodations generally, rather than limiting its review
of evidence to infringements on access to courts.106 The
identification of a fundamental right in Lane did not entirely
control the finding of valid abrogation.
For the purpose of illustration, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s observation in Nevada Department of Human
the heightened scrutiny
Resources v. Hibbs107 is useful:
triggered by suspect classifications makes it “easier for
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”108
Constitutional violations in fundamental rights areas are
perhaps more easily proven because state action is subject to
heightened scrutiny, but that does not mean that it is
impossible to demonstrate a history of violations in
nonfundamental rights areas that may nonetheless require
prophylactic measures triggering the protections of the Equal
Protection Clause.
In fact, the Lane Court explicitly
acknowledged that “[w]hen Congress seeks to remedy or
prevent unconstitutional discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to
enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are
discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic
objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.”109
The prohibition on irrational disability discrimination is
most definitely a “basic objective” of the Equal Protection
Clause. This is true even though Lane’s identification of the
right at stake as the fundamental one of access to courts led
the Court to its final approach to dealing with the ADA’s
purported abrogation – the as applied approach to determining
the validity of the ADA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity.
The Lane Court’s as applied analysis means that the
Supreme Court found “nothing in [its] case law [that required

106

Id. at 529-31.
538 U.S. 721 (2003). This case dealt with the Family Medical Leave Act
“aim[ed] to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the
workplace.” Id. at 728. The Court found that the Family Medical Leave Act did validly
abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 740.
108
Id. at 736.
109
Lane, 541 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added).
107
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it] to consider Title II, with its wide variety of applications, as
an undifferentiated whole.”110 The Court considered congruence
and proportionality as it applied to the fundamental right of
access to courts only, in relation to the documented history of
unconstitutional violations both in public services generally
and in the administration of justice specifically.111 The Lane
majority rejected the dissent’s contention that prior case law
mandated it had to examine Title II and all the protections
outlined therein to validate abrogation in this context.112 The
Lane majority countered that Garrett in particular supports
this as applied approach because Garrett both determined the
validity of abrogation as to the “enforcement of a single
constitutional right”113 and only as to Title I of the ADA. The
Court was content to keep its holding narrow, concluding:
Whatever might be said about Title II’s other applications, the
question presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly
subject the states to private suits for money damages for failing to
provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or even to voting booths,
but whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the
constitutional right of access to the courts.114

The explicit limits of this as applied approach should
not invalidate abrogation under Title II addressing in all
instances that do not implicate a fundamental right. To
appropriately apply Lane in other contexts, it is necessary to
understand the analysis that follows the Court’s outlining of
the metes and bounds of the specific right at stake. In line
with the congruence and proportionality test, and in a similar
manner to the Garrett Court, the Lane Court thoroughly
discussed the legislative history behind enactment of Title II
and its purported remedies.
3. The Court’s Use of the Legislative History
The ADA’s legislative history supports the proposition
that the ADA validly abrogates sovereign immunity in varying
Title II contexts. Whether the object of legislation is remedying
violations of a fundamental right, as in Lane, or a
110

Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
112
Id. at 530 n.18. See also id. at 534 (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that
even Rehnquist’s more “expansive enquiry” would have the same result).
113
Id. at 531 n.18 (emphasis added).
114
Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31.
111
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nonfundamental right, as in Garrett, the Court engages in the
examination of the legislative record. Therefore, this analysis
may again be understood through comparison with Garrett and
through use of the Lane Court’s own distinguishing from
Garrett.
Distinction from Garrett has at least two components in
the Lane analysis: nonfundamental as opposed to fundamental
right identification and comparison of legislative histories
evidencing state constitutional violations in Title I as opposed
to Title II. The legislative history of Title I cited in Garrett did
not support legislative congruence and proportionality because
the constitutional violations demonstrated in the record related
primarily to private, not public, employment. Put simply, this
legislative history of private discrimination could not have
supported congruence and proportionality considering the
ADA’s requirements of the state, a public entity.115 The Lane
Court remembered
that the ‘overwhelming majority’ of [the] evidence [in Garrett]
related to ‘the provision of public services and public
accommodations, which areas are addressed in Titles II and III,’
rather than Title I [and] that neither the ADA’s legislative findings
nor its legislative history reflected a concern that the States had
been engaging in a pattern of unconstitutional employment
discrimination.116

The Garrett Court engaged in the standard right
identification process that Lane followed.117 Garrett defined the
right alleged to be violated, the guarantee of equal protection in
the employment context,118 and discussed the decisive dearth of
legislative history outlining violations.119

115
But see id. at 551-52. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated that there was little evidence of discrimination by the states
at all in the legislative record. Id. Seemingly to the contrary, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s argument in Garrett regarding legislative history could be construed to
mean that the evidence of discrimination by the state in public services was indeed
present and strong. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 371-72
& n.7 (2001).
116
Lane, 541 U.S. at 521-22 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7) (internal
citations omitted).
117
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
118
Id. (“[W]e look to our prior decisions under the Equal Protection Clause
dealing with the issue.”)
119
The Garrett Court was looking at the legislative record of Title I
specifically. Id. at 368-74. Lane followed this pattern, unchanged in this particular
sense by the involvement of a fundamental right. Lane, 541 U.S. at 523-24.
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Once the constitutional rights at stake were iterated,
the Lane Court proceeded with the traditional and influential
examination of legislative history that is entirely in line with
Garrett and other precedent.120 The Court’s mention of a “more
searching judicial review”121 required in the context of
fundamental rights did not eclipse its acknowledgment that
Title II also seeks to prohibit “irrational disability
discrimination . . . .”122 Title II’s duty to accommodate may well
meet the congruence and proportionality standard in other
contexts given the great extent of legislative history involving
other constitutional violations, absent the implication of a
fundamental right.123
The Lane Court explained why the ADA’s legislative
history legitimizes Title II abrogation of sovereign immunity in
reference to access to courts where Title I did not in reference
to private employment in Garrett.124 The Garrett Court was not
120
Lane, 541 U.S. at 523. The Court states that “[w]hether Title II validly
enforces these constitutional rights is a question that ‘must be judged with reference to
the historical experience which it reflects.’” Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
121
Id. at 522-23.
122
Id. at 522. See also Brief for Paralyzed Veterans of America et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellants, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667),
2003 WL 22721614, at *5. (“Congress’ findings explicitly and unambiguously
encompass discrimination in public areas that are largely or entirely within the
purview of the States, as well as multiple areas that indisputably include State
conduct. Congress also specifically found that the discrimination at issue was
irrational, noting a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment . . . resulting from stereotypic assumptions.’”) (citations omitted). This brief also outlines “Patterns of
Unconstitutional State Discrimination in Education.” Id. at *19-21.
123
“Because this implicates the right of access to the courts, we need not
consider whether Title II’s duty to accommodate exceeds what the Constitution
requires in classes of cases that implicate only Cleburne’s prohibition on irrational
discrimination.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 532 n.20.
124
The Garrett Court’s holding that “Congress did not validly abrogate the
states’ sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under
Title I[,]” 531 U.S. at 374 n.9, left open the question as to Title II, especially after the
Garrett Court repeated that there was evidence present addressing discrimination in
the public sector, covered by Titles II and III. Id. at 369-71, 371 n.7. Garrett also
suggested that not only does Title I not validly abrogate sovereign immunity, but that
perhaps Congress never meant it to in the context of public employment as opposed to
in the other contexts for which there is a massive amount of evidence of disability
discrimination in the legislative history: “[T]here is . . . strong evidence that Congress’
failure to mention States in its legislative findings addressing discrimination in
employment reflects that body’s judgment that no pattern of unconstitutional state
action has been documented.” Id. at 372. This indicates that the Garrett opinion is not
only based on the Court’s finding that the legislation is entirely incongruent to any
constitutional violation it seeks to remedy, but also based upon the Court’s impression
that public employment was not a context in which Congress determined people needed
protection under the ADA. See also LEWIS, supra note 28, at §5.35, at 440 n.42 (“A
negative pregnant in Garrett suggests that the Court might incline more favorably
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convinced by legislative history and task force reports
indicating Congress’ recognition of a history of pervasive
employment discrimination in the public sector partly due to
the lack of any such specific instances being mentioned in the
Act’s legislative findings themselves.125 The Act’s findings cited
by the Garrett Court do, however, mention public services as
“critical areas” in which “discrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists . . . .”126 This language supports the
Garrett Court’s seeming concession that there is significant
evidence of discrimination in the public sector, specifically in
public services and accommodations that are covered in ADA
Titles II and III. This evidence was persuasive enough for
Congress to include it in the Act itself, indicating that Congress
found the findings amounted to a history of pervasive
unconstitutional state action that it was aiming to remedy.
Another aspect of comparison in the legislative histories
discussed in Garrett and Lane relates to the type of legislative
histories the Court uses or rejects in the two cases. One of
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s major concerns, in both the Garrett
decision and the Lane dissent, was the use of anecdotal and
broad evidence to analyze the validity of abrogation as part of
legislative congruence and proportionality aimed to enforce a
specific constitutional guarantee.127 Chief Justice Rehnquist
insisted that the Lane Court used evidence rejected by the
Garrett Court, evidence that cannot possibly demonstrate a
history of pervasive state discrimination in either the public
employment or the access to court areas.128 It is not surprising
towards effective Congressional abrogation of the states’ immunity from actions under
ADA Titles II and III. The Court notes that the legislative record and resulting
findings in Senate and House reports were deficient respecting a history of state
employment (i.e., Title I) discrimination against the disabled, specifically
distinguishing the more ample record and findings about public services and
accommodations.”).
125
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-71.
126
42 U.S.C. §12101(3) (2000). The legislative findings here also mention
‘education’ as discussed infra Part IV. Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in
Lane reiterated this point. It stated that because access to courts was not mentioned in
the legislative findings, similar to the silence on public employment, Congress did not
“truly under[stand the] [task force] information as reflecting a pattern of
unconstitutional behavior by the States.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 546 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
127
Lane, 541 U.S. at 542-43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
128
Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Rather than limiting its discussion of constitutional violations to the due
process rights on which it ultimately relies, the majority sets out on a wideranging account of societal discrimination against the disabled. This
digression recounts historical discrimination against the disabled through
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that the Lane majority found Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
objections in this regard “puzzling.”129 The distinctions the
Garrett Court made were categorical; the Court primarily
distinguished public employment from private employment,
specific to equal protection in employment. In contrast, the
voluminous record of discrimination in public services that
Lane detailed includes examples of discrimination in access to
courts, and the Court took access to courts to be a part of Title
II’s public services.
Instead of making categorical
comparisons130 like the Garrett Court, the Lane Court dealt
with one category, public services, and the subcategory of
access to courts.131
The Lane Court left open the possibility that Title II,
unlike Title I, would survive abrogation analysis without the
identification of a fundamental right. The Court’s severing of
Title II from the rest of the ADA and examination of Title II as
it applied only to the guarantee of access to courts left future
decisions regarding abrogation under Title II in different public
service contexts open to separate analyses.

institutionalization laws, restrictions on marriage, voting, and public
education, conditions in mental hospitals, and various other forms of unequal
treatment in the administration of public programs and services. Some of
this evidence would be relevant if the Court were considering the
constitutionality of the statute as a whole; but the Court rejects that
approach in favor of a narrower “as applied” inquiry. We discounted much
the same type of outdated, generalized evidence in Garrett as unsupportive of
Title I’s ban on employment discrimination.
Id. at 541-42 (internal citations omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist is highly critical of
this approach, even though it may be argued that it is quite in line with his Garrett
parsing of the ADA.
129
Id. at 528.
130
The categories posited opposite one another in Garrett are ‘public’ and
‘private’ employment. This is the most influential distinction in the record that Garrett
examines, leading it to conclude that public employment was not contemplated by the
Title I protections – there was no evidence that Title I targeted discrimination in public
employment. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-71.
131
The Lane Court also declared that the Congressional record bolstering the
ADA was even stronger than that examined in Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721 (2003), where the Court definitively found congruence and proportionality of
prophylactic legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 based on Congressional findings
of the same kind: “[T]he record of constitutional violations in this case – including
judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and statistical, legislative, and
anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of persons with disabilities from the
enjoyment of public services – far exceeds the record in Hibbs.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 529.
Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s argument in his Lane dissent is similar to
Justice Kennedy’s dissent from the Rehnquist authored majority in Hibbs. See Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 746-48.
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TITLE II AND THE ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN THE EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT

This section uses Lane’s as applied analysis to examine
claims brought in the education context under Title II. Lane’s
narrow holding does not foreclose private suits for equitable
relief and money damages in public service contexts that do not
implicate fundamental rights; instead, the decision encourages
analysis of each specific case of discrimination in the various
public service contexts contemplated by Title II. Because
public education is unique among services offered by the
government, it deserves special consideration in the abrogation
analysis. Thus, ADA Title II claims brought in the public
education context evince a greater likelihood of valid
abrogation, which is supported by the legislative history of the
ADA Title II. Lane’s language, including the reference to
accessing anything from “hockey rinks [to] voting booths,”132
demonstrates that the Court expects a wide range of rights
asserted between these two extremes. Decisions along the
spectrum will depend largely on the congressional record of
recent and significant constitutional violations in public
services to determine the congruence and proportionality of the
legislation.
Given the relative lack of case law analyzing the
validity of Title II specifically, Lane impacts the way courts
should look at Title II, with and without the fundamental
rights piece of the analysis. Two recent cases, McNulty v.
Board of Education of Calvert County133 and Association for
Disabled Americans v. Florida International University,134
consider the Title II context of public education that does not
trigger the fundamental rights analysis. Both cases rely on
Lane and reach opposite results. The remainder of this Note
will focus on the potential for abrogation in the context of
public education, explaining how the District Court of
Maryland misconstrued the Lane precedent and supplementing
132
“Whatever might be said about Title II’s other applications, the question
presented in this case is not whether Congress can validly subject the States to private
suits for money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to hockey rinks, or
even to voting booths, but whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the
constitutional right of access to courts. Because we find that Title II unquestionably is
valid § 5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of
judicial services, we need go no further.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31.
133
No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2520, 2004 WL 1554401 (D. Md. July 8, 2004).
134
405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005).
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the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis to offer more concrete
guidelines for future courts confronting the issue.
A.

The District Court: McNulty v. Board of Education of
Calvert County135

When Ryan McNulty was in the ninth grade, he was
subjected to several disciplinary measures and, primarily as a
disciplinary measure, the vice principal of his public high
school assigned him to a separate education program that was
outside of the mainstream of classes.136 This program did not
offer the same classes as the mainstream track, and Ryan
completed his tenth grade year at a private school where he
excelled.137 When he returned to the public high school for the
eleventh grade, Ryan was subject to several more disciplinary
measures that he felt were inflicted unfairly, including at least
two suspensions.138 Ryan McNulty’s diagnosed disability was
Attention
Deficit
Hyperactivity
Disorder
(ADHD).139
Administrators did not consider his conduct to be a
manifestation of his disability.140
After Ryan was told he would not be promoted due to
his absences even though he passed all of his classes, his
parents objected and the school eventually agreed to promote
him.141 Ryan graduated from the school in June 2002.142
McNulty alleged that a series of disciplinary referrals, failure
to adhere to a section 504 education plan, and retaliation
against parents by the school143 representatives all made out
violations of Title II’s provision that “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

135

2004 WL 1554401.
McNulty, 2004 WL 155401, at *1.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at *2.
142
McNulty, 2004 WL 155401, at *2.
143
This Note uses the McNulty acknowledgement of the Board of Education as
a state agency. Id. at *4. The Board of Education in this case may be considered an
arm of the state for the purposes of sovereign immunity analysis.
136
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programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.”144
The McNulty court dismissed the ADA Title II claim on
a 12(b)(6) motion without reaching the merits of the claim,
citing Lane as the basis for dismissal.145 McNulty referred to
Lane’s as applied method and found that “Eleventh
Amendment immunity remains intact for education claims
under Title II of the ADA.”146 Lane did not call for such a result
in the education context. The facts in McNulty implicate the
section 5 enforcement power enacting the ADA as “appropriate
legislation” to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee, rather than the due process guarantee
discussed in Lane. In this context, Title II protects individuals
against irrational disability discrimination in public education.
The facts do not trigger the fundamental rights portion of the
Lane analysis, but nonetheless support Title II’s legitimate
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.147
The legislative history documenting violations and the
importance of equality in the provision of educational services
make out a stronger case for abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in education than in other contexts.
The McNulty court’s rationale was based entirely on
education not being a fundamental right and disabled persons
not being members of a suspect class.148 While purporting to be
based on Lane, this analysis did not implement Lane’s
methodology. Instead, the McNulty court substituted one
question – whether there is a fundamental right at stake – for
the lengthy and complex section 5 abrogation analysis that
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, up to and including Lane,
mandates. The McNulty court’s approach is more analogous to
the Sixth Circuit’s decisions in Popovich and Lane, rather than
to the approach the U.S. Supreme Court set forth in Lane.
The Supreme Court did not rely on the due process-equal

144

Id. at *6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000)). Although McNulty alleged
claims under Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 504, and 29 U.S.C. § 794, this Note will only
discuss whether dismissal of the ADA Title II claim was appropriate. Id. at *2.
145
Id. at *3.
146
McNulty, 2004 WL 155401, at *3.
147
Abrogation in this context is valid because Congress enacted ADA Title II
to prevent irrational disability discrimination in the face of recent and significant
evidence of such discrimination and because the education context warrants special
consideration. Preventing irrational disability discrimination is a “basic objective[]” of
the Equal Protection Clause. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004).
148
McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *10-11.
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protection divide for its holding.
The Court instead
exhaustively examined the legislative history and the
congruence and proportionality of Title II’s remedy. In this
reliance, the Lane decision directed courts, including the
district court in McNulty, to look into the specific legislative
findings in the area of public education, an endeavor that may
have resulted in denial of the defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion. In
heavy reliance on the due process-equal protection divide,
McNulty briefly mentioned that “state action affecting the
disabled is subject only to rational basis review”149 but did not
explain how this would affect the abrogation analysis. In fact,
the court did not acknowledge the prohibition on irrational
disability discrimination as potentially providing any floor for
state action.
The absence of a fundamental right does not signify the
absence of any constitutional guarantee whatsoever; in this
case, the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against
irrational disability discrimination should trigger the full
abrogation analysis for an alleged violation of Title II. Lane’s
Title II analysis maintains the validity of the ADA’s legitimate
goal of prohibiting irrational state discrimination and the
fundamental right identification is not essential. As Judge
Moore and the Lane majority would agree, evidence of “states’
discrimination against the disabled in areas such as voting and
education . . . clearly implicate[s] the Equal Protection
Clause.”150
B.

The Eleventh Circuit: Association for Disabled
Americans v. Florida International University151

The plaintiffs in Association for Disabled Americans
alleged that FIU violated the ADA Title II by, among other
things, “failing to provide qualified sign language interpreters,
failing to provide adequate auxiliary aids and services such as
effective note takers, and failing to furnish appropriate aids to
its students with disabilities such as physical access to certain
programs and facilities at FIU.”152 The plaintiffs alleged that
these failures constituted the exclusion and denial of public
149

Id. (quoting Wessel v. Glendening, 306 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 820
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring).
151
405 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2005).
152
Id. at 956.
150
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services to people with disabilities prohibited by Title II and
they sought injunctive relief to prevent further violations.153
The Eleventh Circuit found that “[t]he relief available
under Title II of the ADA is congruent and proportional to the
injury and the means adopted to remedy the injury”154
primarily because “education, though not fundamental, is vital
to the future success of our society.”155 The court accepted
Lane’s examination of the legislative history of Title II as a
whole as evidencing enough violations to support the
congruence and proportionality of abrogation of sovereign
immunity for suits in the education context.156 The court
acknowledged that “classifications relating to education only
involve rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause,”157 and differentiated public education from other public
service contexts covered by Title II because of “the importance
of education in maintaining our basic institutions and the
lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child.”158 In
this way, the court sought to distinguish “public education from
other rights subject to rational basis review.”159
If the Association for Disabled Americans court followed
the reasoning of Judge Moore’s Popovich concurrence, it would
have provided a better guide for courts deciding the abrogation
question in future ADA Title II challenges in the education
context. Indeed, the court could have explicitly recognized that
section 5 grants Congress the power to take “some affirmative
steps to ensure that the disabled have access to governmental
programs” and that they are not arbitrarily discriminated
against.160 The Eleventh Circuit’s emphasis on the importance
of education is significant and essential, but its sole reliance on
153
Id. Interestingly, the plaintiff originally argued that the precedent of
Garrett did not apply to claims for injunctive relief, but only to claims for money
damages. Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (S.D.
Fla. 2001). The district court rejected this argument in granting the defendants’
motion to dismiss because the “Eleventh Amendment bars suit against an
unconsenting state for injunctive relief as well as for money damages.” Id. at 1295.
This Note likewise does not separate the claims for equitable and compensatory relief
in its abrogation analysis.
154
Ass’n for Disabled Ams., 405 F.3d at 959.
155
Id. at 958.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 957.
158
Id.
159
Ass’n for Disabled Ams., 405 F.3d at 957 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 221 (1982)).
160
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 820
(6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring).
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that importance leaves the decision vulnerable to future
opinions emphasizing that education is not a fundamental
right. Because education does not implicate the Due Process
Clause under our current constitutional jurisprudence, critics
could argue that abrogation of sovereign immunity in
legislation promulgated under the section 5 power enforcing
the Equal Protection Clause is not justified. While Association
for Disabled Americans answered the abrogation question
correctly, it left gaps in its reasoning.
C.

Lane and Education Claims Brought Against the State
under ADA Title II
1. Reiterating the Proper Standard

Proper sovereign immunity abrogation analysis requires
the two-step Lane inquiry that determines whether the
legislation in question (1) expressly abrogates sovereign
immunity, and (2) passes the Boerne proportionality test by
being a congruent and proportional remedy to identified
constitutional violations.
The ADA clearly indicates its
The Boerne
intention to abrogate sovereign immunity.161
proportionality test, involving definition of the “metes and
bounds”162 of the right at stake and determining whether an act
is prophylactic, congruent, and proportional, demands a more
thorough analysis in the educational context than that
performed in McNulty and even in Association for Disabled
Americans. The alternative approach that is consistent with
Lane necessarily encompasses discussion of both the nature of
the right to education and the legislative findings that support
ADA Title II protection and abrogation of sovereign immunity
in the educational context as an enforcement of the Equal
Protection Clause.
2. Scope of the Right
Education is not a fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution,163 but the Court has considered education to be
“[p]erhaps the most important function of state and local
161

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004).
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
163
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973);
Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 1998).
162
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governments.”164 Equal protection demands that because state
constitutions have chosen to provide public education,165 the
right to an education “must be made available to all on equal
terms.”166 Additionally, the Court has not considered disability
a suspect classification.167 Therefore, equal protection of the
laws prohibits only irrational disability discrimination in the
education context.168
McNulty did not acknowledge that constitutional
violations of equal protection may occur as a result of irrational
disability discrimination prohibited by the ADA Title II. The
McNulty court compared Lane’s language stating that
infringements on access to courts warrant a “more searching
judicial review”169 with the Cleburne determination170 that
164

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See, e.g., MD CONST., art. VIII, § 1 (“The General Assembly, at its First
Session after the adoption of this Constitution, shall by Law establish throughout the
State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools; and shall provide by
taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance.”)
166
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. See also John C. Eastman, When Did Education
Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State Constitutional Provisions for Education
1776-1900, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 33 (1998) (discussing the right, or lack thereof, in
state constitutions throughout U.S. history and concluding “[i]f many of the State
constitutional provisions, even those that appeared obligatory, did not create in
children a right to free education, the combination of those constitutional provisions
and the statutes enacted under them, together with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, did provide a right, not to education per se, but to an
education equal to that being provided to others”).
167
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
168
See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)
(emphasizing “that States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make
special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such
individuals are rational”). Garrett discusses the nonsuspect classification of disability
and examines a nonfundamental protection against irrational disability discrimination
in public employment. The Garrett Court was looking at Title I, and, this Note argues,
differs from Lane’s result because of the dearth of legislative history supporting Title I
in the public employment context, not because of the nonfundamental nature of the
right at stake.
169
McNulty v. Bd. of Educ. of Calvert County, No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2520,
2004 WL 1554401, at *10 (D. Md. July 8, 2004) (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
522-23 (2004)).
170
Interestingly, in a letter dated July 13, 1989, the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Mackey, responded to Senator Coats’ concern about the
immunity provision in the ADA, especially as regarding burden on the courts. The
correspondence did not address, however, any question as to the validity of abrogation
of sovereign immunity generally. (Question by Senator Coats: “Section 603 waives the
immunity of the states from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. Is this a back-door attempt to create a suspect class, i.e., the
disabled, without any hearings or formal congressional finding? What will be the effect
on the backlog of cases in the federal courts?” Response from Deputy Assistant
Attorney Mackey: “The ADA would establish a statutory prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of disability by, inter alia, State and local governments. We do not
interpret the Act to change relevant constitutional standards, and would review
165
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“state action affecting the disabled is subject only to rational
basis review.”171 The McNulty court then used this comparison
to establish a distinction between the Lane outcome and
abrogation of sovereign immunity in the education context.
The court failed to recognize that “Congress . . . has residual
enforcement power for nonsuspect classes, because the Equal
Protection Clause provides meaningful protection to all classes
of persons.”172 The court’s limited analysis only attempted to
demonstrate the scope of the right, not any impossibility of it
being infringed. To come to any conclusion on the abrogation
question,173 the McNulty court should have considered the
legislative history of Title II generally, and then, specifically in
the education context.174
In Association for Disabled Americans, the Eleventh
Circuit’s analysis of the scope of the educational right took into
consideration the importance of equal access to public
educational services while acknowledging that only irrational
disability discrimination is prohibited by the ADA Title II; in
skeptically any proposal that it do so. There have been hearings on the ADA, and it is
now being considered for enactment by Congress according to established procedures.
We have expressed concern that the legislation should in all areas include remedies
designed to avoid excessive burdens on the judicial system.”). Letter from Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John P. Machkey to Senator Dan Coats (July 13, 1989), in
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 816, 822 (G.
John Tysse ed., 1991).
171
McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *3 (citation omitted).
172
Colker, supra note 23, at 674.
173
McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *3. (“A district court ‘ought to consider the
issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity at any time . . . because of its jurisdictional
nature.’”) (citing Suarez Corp. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis
added).
174
The Lane Court used general violations in public services as a basis of the
decision, distinguishing the case from Garrett in that Garrett had involved a claim
against the state where most evidence of discrimination in the legislative history was
in private employment. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004). The Lane Court
used these general violations, as few involve access to courts specifically, see id. at 543
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), as well as the concern for the importance of the due
process guarantee at issue to emphasize the congruence and proportionality of
abrogation as applied to access to courts under Title II. Because there is a substantial
record documenting unconstitutional disability discrimination in public services (in
contrast with the lack of such a record in public employment cited in Garrett) and also
in public education, the specificity of the record further bolsters support for the
congruence and proportionality of the legislation without the identification of a
fundamental right. Clearly, the Lane Court did not require voluminous documentation
of discrimination in access to courts specifically, but instead relied heavily on more
general historical violations in public services with four specific references to access to
courts. Association for Disabled Americans similarly notes that the Lane Court looked
at “the record supporting Title II as a whole” as well as mentioning specific violations
in the administration of public education. 405 F.3d 954, 959 & 959 n.4 (11th Cir.
2005).
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doing so, the court engaged in a more accurate description of
the right at stake than the McNulty court.175 This is the proper
sketch of the educational right and should be the model that
prevails in future cases examining this step of the analysis.
3. Legislative History
Once the “metes and bounds”176 of a particular right
have been outlined, the next step in the proportionality test is
to “examine whether Congress identified a history and
pattern”177 of unconstitutional discrimination by the state
against the disabled. The ADA’s history demonstrates that
Congress identified state discrimination to support Title II;
moreover, Congressional findings outlined several specific
instances of discrimination in public education.
As a starting point, it is helpful to look at evidence in
the record that was particularly lacking in Garrett and
motivated the court there to conclude that sovereign immunity
was not validly abrogated under Title I for discrimination in
public employment. In Garrett, the court repeatedly referred to
the legislative history’s emphasis on “employment in the
private sector”178 to argue against the possibility of legislation
in proportion to any identified discrimination by the state in
public employment.
A Senate report179 supporting the ADA, almost
immediately after recognizing persistent discrimination also in
the areas of “public accommodations, public services,
transportation, and tele-communications”180 and that “[p]eople
with disabilities as a group occupy an inferior status socially,
economically, vocationally, and educationally,”181 included the
testimony of an individual who experienced discrimination
resulting in her exclusion from public school.182 Interestingly,
175

Ass’n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir.

2005).
176

Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
Id. See also Colker, supra note 23, at 667-69 (discussing importance of factfinding in section 5 enforcement power analysis).
178
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (1989)).
179
S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6. Also cited extensively in Garrett, 531 U.S. at
370.
180
S. REP. NO. 101-116.
181
Id. (emphasis added).
182
Id. at 7. Note that this type of anecdotal evidence is decidedly different
from the anecdotes Garrett cites as never having been submitted to Congress and
therefore not weighty. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
177
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this Senate report also quoted testimony that alludes to the
particularly profound effects discrimination has in schools: “As
Rosa Parks taught us, and as the Supreme Court ruled thirtyfive years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, segregation
‘affects one’s heart and mind in ways that may never be
The report continued to note instances of
undone.’”183
discrimination as it has affected schools and schoolchildren,
citing the Supreme Court case Alexander v. Choate,184 which
referred to an earlier case dealing with the exclusion from
school of an academically competitive child with cerebral palsy
because “his teacher claimed his physical appearance ‘produced
a nauseating effect’ on his classmates.”185 This report pointedly
referred to disability discrimination in the public schools as a
pervasive problem and a major motivator for the enactment of
the ADA before even discussing the specific legislation and its
requirements.
The House also noted disability discrimination in
education, citing statistics reaching deep into the problems in
our education system when it comes to providing equal public
access, stating that current legislation has not changed the
disappointing numbers186 and that “[f]orty percent of all adults
with disabilities did not finish high school – three times more
than non-disabled individuals.”187 Additionally, the report cited
testimony regarding the inaccessibility of school buildings as a
major problem and as indicative of the need for enforcement
provisions that require real changes and accessibility.188 This
evidence and need acknowledged in the legislative record
stands in “stark”189 contrast to the lack of evidence in Garrett.190
Thus, the evidence supporting Title II’s remedial measures as
183

S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494

(1954)).
184

469 U.S. 287 (1985).
S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 7.
186
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32 (1989) (noting that this statistic existed
“[d]espite the enactment of Federal legislation such as the Education for Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973”). See also S. REP. NO. 101-116,
at 12 (citing testimony about the then extant nondiscrimination federal laws including
the Rehabilitation Act that, because “tied to the receipt of Federal financial
assistance[,] [result in] total confusion for the disabled community and the inability to
expect consistent treatment”).
187
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32.
188
Id. at 40.
189
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (using
this language to cite the differences between legislative history that has influenced the
Court to uphold abrogation in the past and the history presented to support Title I).
190
See supra Part III.C
185
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pertaining to the education context surpasses the Garrett
evidence in volume and content, just as the evidence in Lane
did.
Importantly, the Lane Court also considered the
evidence of constitutional violations in public services
generally, with such violations supporting the validity of Title
II remedies:
[The evidence of constitutional violations,] together with the
extensive record of disability discrimination that underlies it, makes
clear beyond peradventure that inadequate provision of public
services and access to public facilities was an appropriate subject for
prophylactic legislation.191

The Garrett majority clearly acknowledged the record’s
accounts of state discrimination in public services and public
accommodations addressed by Titles II and III of the ADA and
criticized Justice Breyer’s dissent because “[o]nly a small
fraction of the anecdotes [he] identifie[d] in his Appendix C
relate to state discrimination against the disabled in
employment.”192 Justice Breyer countered that “[t]here are
roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments
Both opinions
themselves in the legislative record.”193
acknowledged the voluminous evidence supporting Title II
legislation providing protection to people with disabilities in
the provision of public services.194
The Lane Court did a lot of the work for McNulty and
Association for Disabled Americans in examining the
legislative history of Title II. The McNulty court could have
191

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (emphasis added). See also
supra Part III.C (discussing the categorical distinction (private vs. public employment)
the Garrett Court relied on to find inadequate legislative history in contrast to Lane’s
consideration of public services generally and the subcategory of access to courts).
192
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 n.7.
193
Id. at 379. Justice Breyer goes on to emphasize, “I fail to see how this
evidence ‘fall[s] far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based.” 531 U.S. at 379 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing the majority’s language).
194
Another useful comparison between the Court and the dissent in Garrett,
and again in Lane, would address the amount of case law that supports the contention
that Congress identified a history of unconstitutional disability discrimination in a
particular area. For example, in his Lane dissent Rehnquist points out that there are
only two cases footnoted by the Court that actually found constitutional violations
preceding the enactment of the ADA. Lane, 541 U.S. at 544 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). This would not be a legitimate grievance in the public education context,
considering the cases the court cites to, because they all precede enactment of the ADA
in their findings of constitutional violations against people with disabilities in the
education context. See id. at 525 n.12.
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looked at the Lane decision to make the broad determination
that there was “widespread exclusion of persons with
disabilities from the enjoyment of public services”195
constituting equal protection violations.
Moreover, the
legislative record demonstrated violations specific to the
education context, findings that should strongly compel courts
to proceed to the next step of the proportionality analysis when
considering the right to equal protection in education.
Association for Disabled Americans reflected properly on the
legislative record behind the ADA Title II both generally and
with respect to education-specific violations of equal protection
harming individuals with disabilities.
4. Congruence and Proportionality
Once the underlying violations on which the legislation
is based are clearly identified, the court must decide whether
that legislation is congruent and proportional to remedying
them. The Lane Court decided, after identifying the “pattern of
exclusion and discrimination”196 in the provision of judicial
services, that “Title II’s requirement of program accessibility[]
is congruent and proportional to its object of enforcing the right
of access to the courts.”197 Comparing the pattern and history of
discrimination and exclusion to assess whether the force and
breadth198 of Title II affords the appropriate remedy for a
specific right violation, the Lane Court considered several
factors including the efficacy of prior legislation to address the
constitutional violations and the internal limitations of Title II
These same
that make it a reasonable remedy.199
considerations should apply to examining abrogation in the
education context.

195

Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004).
Id. at 531.
197
Id.
198
When “breadth” is discussed in the context of the ADA, it may be taken to
mean different things. First, it has been established, as is evident in both Garrett and
Lane, that the Titles of the ADA can be considered separately in consideration of
whether sovereign immunity is abrogated legitimately for private claims brought
against the state. Second, one may consider the breadth of each title individually and
whether Lane’s as applied approach is warranted. This Note accepts Lane’s as applied
approach as consistent with the standard. When discussing “breadth,” this Note is
discussing the extent to which the legislation effectively remedies the violation of a
particular right identified (or as applied to a particular right, not applied to all rights
that it could possibly be applied to, i.e. hockey rinks to voting booths).
199
Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
196
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The Lane Court deemed the inefficacy of prior
legislation aimed at the elimination of disability discrimination
as a significant factor behind Congress’ adoption of the ADA.200
The legislative findings generally evidence this failure of
previous law, and the Lane Court understood that “Congress
was justified in concluding that this ‘difficult and intractable
problem’ warranted ‘added prophylactic measures in
response.’”201 Similarly, “added” prophylactic measures are
desperately needed in the education context. The failure of
education specific disability law is significant in the analysis of
whether Title II was an appropriate remedy in the education
context.
The ADA’s legislative history cites the failure of the
Rehabilitation Act202 specifically to remedy discrimination
against the disabled and create consistency.203 The Education
for All Handicapped Children Act,204 which focused on disability
discrimination in the education context and served as the basis
for many complaints regarding the provision of appropriate
services to students, had been in effect for 15 years at the time
the ADA was adopted; nonetheless, Congress found and
documented persistent and egregious disability discrimination
in the education context.
Both McNulty and Association for Disabled Americans
should have performed this piece of the Lane analysis as
prescribed. The McNulty court did not consider the legislative
history of the ADA Title II with reference to educational
violations, nor did it consider the inefficacy of prior legislation
that might warrant its powerful remedy. If the District Court
of Maryland had considered legislation specific to education
that was in effect at the time the ADA was adopted, it may
have acknowledged that the ADA’s strong prohibitions and
200
201

Id.
Id. at 531 (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737

(2003)).
202
See THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 1-2,
& n.5 (2001) (discussing the genesis of these laws and also how the requirement of a
free and appropriate public education is similar under the ADA and section 504); see
generally Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA 323
(Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (discussing not only the prevalence of section 504
cases in higher education, but the potential of the regulations implementing the ADA
negatively affecting the success of 504 suits).
203
The report refers to the Rehabilitation Act specifically. See supra note 187
and accompanying text.
204
The EHA became the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 1990.
20 U.S.C. § 1400-1487 (2000).
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remedies were necessary because the inefficacy of prior
legislation called for the “clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities,”205 especially in the education
context. The persistence of these violations despite prior
remedial legislation led inevitably to the conclusion that
stronger laws were needed. The Lane Court’s discussion of the
exact requirements of Title II – whether they met the need
recognized by Congress while only prohibiting irrational
disability discrimination in the education context – would have
been appropriate for the McNulty court to consider. Likewise,
Association for Disabled American’s argument would have been
stronger if it had outlined the inefficacy of prior legislation that
warranted the passage of the ADA.
The ADA’s internal limitations also make it an
extremely reasonable response under Congress’ section 5
enforcement power.
The “reasonable modifications”206
requirement of Title II, and the theme of reasonable
accommodations in the ADA as a whole, may be interpreted
both to push the legislation past prior inadequate laws and to
aim at congruence and proportionality.207 As the Lane Court
emphasized in its examination of congruence and
proportionality,
Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make
judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does
not require States to compromise their essential eligibility criteria
for public programs. It requires only “reasonable modifications” that
would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided,

205

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
Id. § 12131(2).
207
For instance, “Robert Burgdorf, the principal drafter of the original version
of the statute, calls the ADA ‘a second-generation civil rights statute that goes beyond
the “naked framework” of earlier statutes and adds much flesh and refinement to
traditional nondiscrimination law.’” Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and
Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1063 (2004) (quoting Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation
Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. L. REV. 413, 415 (1991). Rovner also insists
that the Garrett decision was wrongly decided and portrays a “cramped” view of equal
protection. Id. at 1074. Although this Note emphasizes that Lane is consistent with
Garrett because of the different analyses under Title I and Title II resulting from the
different levels of evidence, Rovner’s Garrett arguments can be seen as illuminating in
consideration of courts like McNulty narrowing Lane.
Additionally, Rovner’s
discussion about the changing conceptualization of disability behind the ADA is helpful
in understanding the congressional intentions in light of the record of discrimination.
Id. at 1064.
206
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and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise
eligible for service.208

The ADA is both more powerful than prior legislation
and reasonable in its requirements, especially in the face of the
voluminous record of constitutional violations it sought to
remedy.209
The McNulty court should have asked, even if the
modifications required under the ADA are congruent and
proportional to the targeted violations, whether abrogation of
sovereign immunity was congruent and proportional in itself.
In other words, it is necessary to consider whether the option to
enforce private rights against states by making the states
liable for monetary damages as well as injunctive relief is an
appropriate remedy as applied in each public service context.
Clearly, the Lane Court found the option of enforcement
against the state via private suit congruent and proportional in
light of the record of violations. The Lane Court emphasized
that “the question presented in this case is not whether
Congress can validly subject the States to private suits for
money damages for failing to provide reasonable access to
hockey rinks, or even to voting booths, but whether Congress
had the power under § 5 to enforce the constitutional right of
access to the courts.”210 Similarly, the question here is limited
to whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign
immunity in enacting the ADA Title II to remedy persistent

208
Lane, 541 U.S. at 531-32 (2004) (internal citations omitted). “As Title II’s
implementing regulations make clear, the reasonable modification requirement can be
satisfied in a number of ways . . . . And in no event is the entity required to undertake
measures that would impose an undue financial or administrative burden, threaten
historic preservation interests, or effect a fundamental alteration in the nature of the
service.” Id. at 532.
209
The argument for the congruence and proportionality of the use of the
section 5 power to afford this measured remedy in the education context is strong
because of the pointed and substantial legislation and the base assumption at the time
the ADA was passed that there was simply not enough existing legislative protection
for individuals with disabilities. See Colker, supra note 23, at 696.
210
Lane, 541 U.S. at 530-31. As the lower court discussed in Association for
Disabled Americans v. Florida International University, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295
(S.D. Fla. 2001), it is possible to argue that the validity of abrogation may be
determined by examining the congruence and proportionality with respect to relief
requested – money damages versus equitable injunctive relief. See supra note 153 and
accompanying text. The Lane Court found that states are not immune from actions for
money damages for violations of the ADA Title II; this Note argues that there is no
need to separate the types of relief as the less costly injunctive relief would have been
found, as it was by the Eleventh Circuit in the context of education, to be congruent
and proportional under the Lane analysis.
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irrational disability discrimination in the context of public
education.
D.

Education’s Position on the Spectrum: Closer to a Voting
Booth than to a Hockey Rink

This Note assumes that the McNulty court’s basic
conclusion about the scope of the right to education is correct: it
is not fundamental.211 Although the McNulty court interpreted
the scope of the right correctly, it failed to draw from prior
education case law demonstrating that the provision of
education to people with disabilities cannot be equated to the
scope of the right defined in Garrett.
The “ordinary considerations of cost and convenience”212
may not serve as the rational basis exempting state
accommodation in the education context as easily as it may in
other contexts. Education’s place on the spectrum between
voting booths and hockey rinks requires special consideration
in the abrogation analysis. Lane countenanced such unique
treatment when it discussed the petitioner’s contentions and
the spectrum of rights Title II purports to protect. The
language the Court used aligns public education and voting
booth access on one side of the spectrum and positions hockey
rink access on the other.213 Education, and its nonfundamental
but “important,” even essential, status in Supreme Court
precedent,214 supports a unique approach to the abrogation
211
Thus Congress is only to look to the object of protecting people with
disabilities from irrational disability discrimination in the education context as
Congress would in the employment context to determine the validity of the wielding of
section 5 enforcement power.
212
Lane, 541 U.S. at 533.
213
“According to petitioner, the fact that Title II applies not only to public
education and voting booth access but also to seating at state-owned hockey rinks
indicates that Title II is not appropriately tailored to serve its objectives. Id. at 530.
Interestingly, this language is very similar to that of Moore’s in Popovich. See infra
Part III.D.
214
Of course, this essentiality is most notably emphasized in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). This Note does not argue for the constitutional
status of education in and of itself, just that the importance of education should play
into the congruence and proportionality assessment and that the Court has accorded
education special status that may do this without changing the way education rights
are currently conceptualized. For the argument that education may be considered “an
unenumerated affirmative” constitutional right, see Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical
Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the
End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 553 (1992). Bitensky also
notes origins of a “negative right” to education originating with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), and persisting into today through substantive due process’ liberty
interest. Id. at 563-64.
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analysis in the education context specific to education’s
This unique
important position in our rights history.215
approach to education is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
treatment of alleged constitutional violations in the education
context, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education.
Brown, in finding that segregation of public schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution,216 introduced the language the
Court uses to the present day to describe the role of public
education in our society, which does not define any positive
constitutional right to education through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.217 Importantly, in

215
This Note does not argue that the importance of education requires
“creat[ing] substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33
(1973). It does, however, acknowledge Rodriguez’s instruction that
the key to discovering whether education is “fundamental” is not to be found
in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to
subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education
is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Id. at 33-34. For the argument that this right is implicit in the Constitution, see
Bitensky, supra note 214, at 553. See also Kristen Safier, Comment, The Question of a
Fundamental Right to a Minimally Adequate Education, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 993, 1020
(2001) (arguing that the Rodriguez court left open the possibility of finding a
fundamental right to a minimally adequate education implicit in the Constitution).
This Note argues that the current state of the law and conceptualization of the “right”
to education allows for special weight in the abrogation analysis. This is not an
argument for finding a fundamental right to a minimally adequate education through
the protections of substantive due process such that would be enforced through section
5.
216
Brown held that:
[T]he plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This
disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (1954). Brown was decided on segregation being
unconstitutional rather than on education as a fundamental right, but nevertheless
extolled the importance of education in its finding.
217
The Brown Court emphasized that:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
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making this finding that segregation violated the guarantee of
equal protection, the Court emphasized that the assessment
“must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout
The Court unequivocally asserted the
the Nation.”218
importance of education, and the responsibility of the states to
make it available to everyone equally once they provide it. Due
partly to this language emphasizing education’s critical value
to citizenship and our democracy, the Court later grappled with
the divide between the importance of this right and arguments
that it may one day be established as a constitutional right
implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.219
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
the Supreme Court upheld Texas’ school financing system
against equal protection and substantive due process
challenges.220 The Court refused to apply strict scrutiny and
rejected wealth as a suspect classification and education as a
fundamental constitutional right.221 Applying rational basis
scrutiny, the Court found that the taxing system combined
with the state interest of maintaining local control over
institutions of public education222 “abundantly” satisfied the
rational basis standard.223 The Rodriguez court did, however,
leave the door open for future decisions to find that “some
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally
protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise” of other
rights including First Amendment rights and utilization of the

Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. 493 (emphasis added).
218
Id. at 492-93.
219
Justice Marshall’s Rodriguez dissent echoed some of the Brown language
that emphasized the intersection of education and citizenship: “the majority’s holding
can only be seen as a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational
opportunity and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in
their earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens.” Rodriguez,
411 U.S. at 70-1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The tension between Marshall’s
dissent and the majority opinion in Rodriguez exemplifies how the Court has struggled
to find the appropriate characterization of the right to education.
220
Id. at 18.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 49-51.
223
Id. at 55.
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vote.224 The Court also suggested that complete deprivation of
education might implicate such a constitutional protection.225
Plyler v. Doe226 took up this latter question. In Plyler,
the Supreme Court applied a heightened standard of scrutiny
and upheld an equal protection challenge to a Texas law.227 The
law denied undocumented children the free public education
available to children who were citizens or of other legal
statuses.228 In rejecting the Texas law, the Supreme Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ classification argument, finding no basis
in the law for deeming illegal aliens to be a suspect class.229
Instead, the Court seemed to base its heightened standard for
that
the
Texas
law on
“well-settled
principles”230
overwhelmingly
consist
of
examples
of
education’s
“fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”231
The Plyler Court emphasized the importance of education to
our society politically, culturally, and constitutionally.232
Interestingly for the purpose of this discussion, Plyler also cited
the government barriers to education as offensive to equal
protection’s goals of advancement based on individual merit
and the importance of education in preparing people to be selfreliant,233 goals similar to those the Americans with Disabilities
Act cited eight years later.234 This extensive outlining of
224
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973). The Court did not find that particular
question before it though, asserting that the students in the Texas system were not
alleging that “the system fail[ed] to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire
the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process.” Id. at 37.
225
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. See also Bitensky, THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
supra note 214, at 566-68 (outlining the evolution of the question of whether an
affirmative constitutional right to education exists and pointing to Rodriguez as the
beginning of the Court’s discourse on the existence of such a positive right).
226
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
227
Id. at 229-30 (emphasizing that “[i]f the State is to deny a discrete group of
innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing
within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some
substantial state interest”) (emphasis added).
228
Id. at 205.
229
Id. at 219 n.19.
230
Id. at 223.
231
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
232
Id. at 221-22.
233
Id.
234
The ADA clearly states that the disadvantaged position of people with
disabilities in our society has “been based on characteristics that are beyond the control
of such individuals and [result] from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.” 42
U.S.C. § 12202 (a)(7) (2000). This section also highlights that “the Nation’s proper
goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
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education’s importance included the Court’s assertion that
although education is not a fundamental constitutional right,
“neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation.”235 Plyler attributed an importance to education
that transcends the more common association to participation
in the democratic process via meaningful voting; the Court
discussed how education reflects on success in areas of
personhood and not just citizenship, as noncitizens play
important roles in American society.236
After the Court discussed education’s elevated role in
society, it began to review the Texas law excluding
undocumented children.237 The Court considered the children’s
lack of responsibility for their immigration statuses.238
Additionally, perhaps spurred by the dicta in Rodriguez, the
Court indicated that this case was unique because it addressed
a complete deprivation of education, rather than a more fluid
and difficult allegation of an inadequate education.239
Significantly, the Court stated that it “may appropriately take
into account [the] costs to the Nation”240 of the law in
determining whether the Texas statute could be upheld and
found that only substantial interests would support rationality
of the law, relative to the extreme costs of depriving children of
education.241 The court found none of the three discernible
state interests – protection from the entry of illegal
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”
Id. at § 12202 (a)(8).
235
Id. at 221. This also may provide an interesting contrast to the Rodriguez
language that highlights the inability of the court to apply a higher level of scrutiny to
Texas’s financing structure because of the Court’s traditional deference to state
substantive economic and social policy. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973). The Rodriguez Court directly compared education to the
provision of welfare benefits in support of its application of the deferential rational
basis review, citing the added complexities of state provision of public education as yet
another reason to apply the lower standard. Id. at 40-43. In contrast, the Plyler court
differentiated education from other benefits and used this differentiation to support its
application of a heightened standard of review. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-24.
236
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 n.20.
237
Id. at 223.
238
Id. at 224.
239
The Rodriguez Court depended heavily upon the lack of absolute
deprivation to reject the equal protection challenge to the Texas law. The Court
emphasized that the claim of an inadequate education provided to one group does not
support the finding of a suspect classification because no “system [can] assure equal
quality of education except in the most relative sense.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20-5 (1973).
240
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
241
Id.
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immigrants, prevention of the burden on the overall quality of
education,242 and distinction based on unlawful status –
substantial enough to justify the statutory deprivation of
education to undocumented children.243
E.

Significance of Context: Education in the Abrogation
Analysis

The status of education in our history should not have
altered the McNulty court’s assertion that disability is not a
suspect class and that education is not a fundamental right
under the Federal Constitution,244 regardless of whether the
Court has left the latter question, at least as to a minimally
adequate education, open.
These decisions do, however,
underscore the importance of education and the Supreme
Court’s willingness to acknowledge the ties that education has
to participating meaningfully in the democratic process, and
particularly in exercising the vote. Notably as well, the Court
has detailed the importance of education in other areas of
American society, even for individuals unable to exercise the
vote.245 Faced with an equal protection challenge to a law that
deprived noncitizens of an education, the Court even applied a
heightened standard of scrutiny when the allegation involved a
nonsuspect class, asserting the costs to the nation of
educational deprivation as an influential factor.246
When it comes to the abrogation analysis, a court
considering whether Title II validly abrogates Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the education context must not only
consider the explicit scope of the education right and the
legislative history documenting unconstitutional violations. It
must also consider the importance of education in our society
and the way that importance has influenced the Court’s equal
protection review. McNulty did not reach the merits of the
case, but dismissed the Title II claim outright because

242

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 (finding no evidence that including undocumented
children in the classroom had a negative impact on the quality of education).
243
Id. at 228-30 (“It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by
denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs
involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.”).
244
All state constitutions currently provide for the right to education to some
degree. Eastman, supra note 166, at 2, 33.
245
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 n.20 (1982).
246
Id. at 224.
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Association for
education is not a fundamental right.247
Disabled Americans appropriately emphasized the uniqueness
of education but failed to discuss the basic constitutional floor
prohibiting irrational discrimination against the disabled.
Focusing on the nature of the right without acknowledging the
legitimacy of legislation abrogating sovereign immunity via the
section 5 power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, left
education decisions vulnerable in the future. The Supreme
Court’s reflections on challenges in the education context
should influence section 5 analysis when Congress has
purported to invoke its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power to preserve the equal protection guarantee.
V.

CONCLUSION

McNulty did not draw much from the Lane analysis, but
simply used the Court’s fundamental rights language to
summarily foreclose the validity of abrogation as applied to
nonfundamental rights like education.248 Instead, the McNulty
court should have considered whether Lane invited a deeper
analysis of each case of discrimination in public services.
Association for Disabled Americans properly considered the
importance of education and the legislative history behind the
ADA, but it failed to address the validity of affirmative section
5 legislation enforcing the equal protection guarantee in areas
that do not generally implicate fundamental rights. The Lane
analysis, sticking to standard evaluation of the section 5
enforcement power and only modifying as required for the facts
of the case, called for consideration of the scope of the right at
stake, the legislative history describing pervasive violations,
the weaknesses of prior legislation that prevented amelioration
of disability discrimination, and the special status the U.S.
Supreme Court has accorded education. Only after such
247
McNulty v. Bd. of Educ. of Calvert County, No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2520,
2004 WL 1554401, at *3 (D. Md. July 8, 2004). If the McNulty court had applied the full
abrogation analysis that Lane demanded, the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of
education under equal protection analysis may have affected not only the
determination of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity, but also the
substantive analysis of McNulty’s claim. For instance, McNulty’s suspensions may
have been alleged to constitute a deprivation of education, or a deprivation of a
minimally adequate education, thus invoking discussion of some of the Court’s
language in Rodriguez and Plyler. Perhaps such allegations would have amounted to
the finding of irrational disability discrimination in school, or even given rise to the
debate about whether education’s constitutional status should be reconsidered.
248
Id. at *3.
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analysis could the McNulty and Association for Disabled
Americans courts have made thorough determinations as to
whether sovereign immunity was validly abrogated for ADA
Title II challenges against states in the educational context.
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